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Abstract
The physical layer security (PLS) performance of a wireless communication link through a large
reflecting surface (LRS) with phase errors is analyzed. Leveraging recent results that express the LRS-
based composite channel as an equivalent scalar fading channel, we show that the eavesdropper’s link is
Rayleigh distributed and independent of the legitimate link. The different scaling laws of the legitimate
and eavesdroppers signal-to-noise ratios with the number of reflecting elements, and the reasonably
good performance even in the case of coarse phase quantization, show the great potential of LRS-aided
communications to enhance PLS in practical wireless set-ups.
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cations.
Manuscript received MONTH xx, YEAR; revised XXX. The review of this paper was coordinated by XXXX. The work of
J. D. Vega Sa´nchez was funded by the Escuela Polite´cnica Nacional, for the development of the project PIGR-19-06 and through
a teaching assistant fellowship for doctoral studies. The work of F.J. Lopez-Martinez was funded by the Spanish Government
and the European Fund for Regional Development FEDER (project TEC2017-87913-R) and by Junta de Andalucia (project
P18-RT-3175, TETRA5G).
J. D. Vega Sa´nchez is with Departamento de Electro´nica, Telecomunicaciones y Redes de Informacio´n, Escuela Polite´cnica
Nacional (EPN), Quito, 170525, Ecuador. (e-mail: jose.vega01@epn.edu.ec).
P. Ramı´rez-Espinosa is with the Connectivity Section, Department of Electronic Systems, Aalborg University, Aalborg Øst
9220, Denmark (e-mail: pres@es.aau.dk).
F. J. Lopez-Martinez is with Departamento de Ingenieria de Comunicaciones, Universidad de Malaga - Campus de Excelencia
Internacional Andalucia Tech., Malaga 29071, Spain (e-mail: fjlopezm@ic.uma.es).
This work has been submitted to the IEEE for publication. Copyright may be transferred without notice, after which this
version may no longer be accessible.
July 28, 2020 DRAFT
2I. INTRODUCTION
Recently, large reflecting surfaces (LRSs) have been proposed as a new paradigm to noticeably
improve the performance of emerging networks in terms of system performance and energy-
efficiency. An LRS consists of a large number of low-cost passive reflecting units, where each
element can adaptively adjust the amplitude reflection and/or the phase shift of the incident
signals [1]. These smart passive devices can be integrated into the infrastructure of future wireless
networks to control the radio propagation environment.
On the other hand, physical layer security (PLS) has drawn full attention for ensuring secure
wireless communications in a low complexity manner. Specifically, PLS intelligently exploits
the inherent randomness of the wireless medium to protect the information in the physical layer
[2]. From an information-theoretic perspective, LRS is a new approach to improve the PLS
performance by reconfiguring the wireless environment for the benefit of the legitimate user.
In this sense, several researchers have addressed their efforts to investigate PLS on LRS-aided
wireless communications systems. For instance, the secrecy performance for LRS-aided multi-
antenna communications was studied in [3–5]. Because of the rather complex nature of the LRS
composite fading model, the analytical characterization of PLS performance metrics is utterly
unfeasible and most works often resort to optimization techniques to maximize the secrecy rates.
In this paper, we investigate the performance of an LRS-aided communication system with
imperfect phase compensation in terms of its PLS performance. We leverage the recent for-
mulation of the LRS composite fading channel as an equivalent scalar channel [6] to gain an
understanding of the potential of LRS-based communications for PLS. The key contributions
of this paper are: first, we show that the distribution of the eavesdropper’s equivalent scalar
fading channel is Rayleigh distributed and its average signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) scales with
n, while the average SNR at the legitimate receiver scales with n2. We also prove that despite
the equivalent channels at both receivers share a number of components, they are statistically
independent under some mild conditions. Finally, we exemplify the limitations of the equivalent
scalar channel approximations for conventional asymptotic high-SNR analyses, which should be
interpreted with caution for outage-based performance metrics.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
We consider an LRS-assisted wireless communication set-up consisting of one source node
Alice (A), one legitimate node Bob (B), one eavesdropper Eve (E), and an LRS, which assists
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3the communication between the legitimate nodes. In the system, the direct link is neglected,
and all terminals are assumed to be equipped with a single antenna, while the LRS has n
low-cost passive reflecting elements R1 . . . Rn. We denote as Hi,1 the fading channel coefficient
between the source A and the reflecting element Ri, whereas Hi,b and Hi,e are the fading channel
coefficients between Ri and the legitimate receiver B and the eavesdropper E, respectively.
Without loss of generality, we consider normalized fading coefficients with unitary power, and
the corresponding average magnitudes are given ∀i = 1 . . . n by a1 = E{|Hi,1|}, a2,b = E{|Hi,b|}
and a2,e = E{|Hi,e|}. We note that {a1, a2,b, a2,e} ≤ 1 in all instances, where the equality only
holds in the limit of a deterministic fading channel, i.e., in the absence of fading. For the sake
of compactness, ab =
√
a1a2,b and ae =
√
a1a2,e are defined. The received signal at B can be
expressed as
Yb =
√
PTLb
n∑
i=1
Hi,1e
jφiHi,bX +Wb, (1)
where X is the transmitted symbol, PT indicates the transmit power at A, Lb encompasses the
path losses for the A-R and R-B links, the antenna gains and reflection losses, and Wb is the
additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN) term with N0 power. Now, the LRS designs the phase
shifts for each element φi so that all phase contributions due to ∠Hi,1 and ∠Hi,b are compensated.
However, the imperfect phase estimation and the limited quantization of phase states at the LRS
causes that a residual random phase error Θi still persists [6], i.e., φi = −∠Hi,1 − ∠Hi,b +Θi.
The equivalent complex channel observed by the legitimate receiver can hence be expressed as
Hb =
1
n
n∑
i=1
|Hi,1‖Hi,b| ejΘi, (2)
and (1) is reformulated as:
Yb = n
√
PTLbHbX +Wb (3)
Now, the received signal at E can be expressed as
Ye =
√
PTLe
n∑
i=1
Hi,1e
jφiHi,eX +We, (4)
where the Le and We are defined in a similar way as Lb and Wb. Because the phase shifts φi
are designed to compensate for the effect of the fading channel coefficients of the legitimate
link, the residual phase errors Ψi affecting the eavesdropper link will be much larger than the
legitimate counterpart and, whenever ∠Hi,e ∼ U [−pi, pi), then Ψi ∼ U [−pi, pi) [7] regardless of
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4the phase distribution of ∠Hi,1. We can define the equivalent complex channel observed by the
eavesdropper as
He =
1
n
n∑
i=1
|Hi,1‖Hi,e| ejΨi, (5)
that yields
Ye = n
√
PTLeHeX +We (6)
With the previous definitions, the instantaneous SNR at the legitimate and eavesdropper’s links
are given by
γb = n
2γ0,b|Hb|2, (7)
γe = n
2γ0,e|He|2, (8)
where we defined γ0,b = PTLb/N0 and γ0,e = PTLe/N0 as the average SNRs at the legitimate
and eavesdropper’s sides in the case of a single reflector LRS (i.e., n = 1).
We aim to determine the system performance in terms of its secrecy capacity CS defined as [8]
CS =max {Cb − Ce, 0} , (9)
where Cb = log2(1+ γb) and Ce = log2(1+ γe) are the capacities of the main and eavesdropper
channels, respectively. We first consider a passive eavesdropper for which Alice does not have
channel state information (CSI) knowledge. Under this premise, Alice can only transmit at a
constant secrecy rate RS and security will be compromised whenever RS exceeds CS. The secrecy
outage probability (SOP) is formulated as the probability that the instantaneous CS falls below
such rate RS, i.e., P = Pr {CS < RS} as
P =
∫ ∞
0
Fγb (τγe + τ − 1) fγe(γe)dγe, (10)
where τ
∆
= 2RS. We also study the active eavesdropping case, in which the CSI of both the main
and the eavesdropper channels is available at Alice. Therefore, Alice can use such information to
adapt her rate. In this setup, the average secrecy capacity (ASC) is the usual metric to evaluate
the secrecy performance. According to [9, Proposition 3], the ASC can be defined as
CS = Cb − L (γb, γe) , (11)
where Cb is the average capacity of the legitimate link and L (γb, γe) can be interpreted as an
ASC loss, defined as
L (γb, γe) = 1ln 2
∫ ∞
0
(1−Fγe (γe))(1−Fγb (γe))
1+γe
dγe ≥ 0. (12)
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5III. SNR DISTRIBUTIONS
A. Distribution of γb
For sufficiently large n, [6] proved that the distribution of Hb is that of a non-circularly
symmetric complex Gaussian random variable (RV) with Ub = ℜ(Hb) and Vb = ℑ(Hb),
so that Ub ∼ N
(
µ, σ2Ub
)
and Vb ∼ N
(
0, σ2Vb
)
, where the parameters of µ = ϕ1a
2
b, σ
2
Ub
=
1
2n
(1 + ϕ2 − 2ϕ21a4b) and σ2Vb = 12n (1− ϕ2), and ϕj are the jth circular moments of Θi. This
implies that Rb = |Hb| follows the Beckmann distribution [10] and hence, the average SNR at
the legitimate receiver γb follows a (squared) Beckmann distribution which is fully characterized
by the following set of parameters K = µ2/(σ2Ub + σ
2
Vb
), q = σUb/σVb and γb = E{γb}. We
note that the parameters K and q have a similar definition as those of the Rician and Hoyt [11]
distributions, respectively. In the scenario under consideration, we have that
K = n
ϕ21a
4
b
1− ϕ21a4b
, (13)
q =
√
1 + ϕ2 − 2ϕ21a4b
1− ϕ2 , (14)
γb = n
2γ0,b
[
ϕ21a
4
b +
1
n
(
1− ϕ21a4b
)]
. (15)
As stated in [6], the average SNR scales with n2. We also observe that the line-of-sight (LOS)
condition of the equivalent scalar channel grows, captured by K, grows with n. Notably, the
non-circular symmetry caused by the phase errors captured by q ∈ [1,∞) is independent of the
number of elements of the LRS. We note that in the absence of phase errors, then Hb becomes a
real Gaussian RV and hence |Hb| follows a folded normal (FN) distribution [12] with parameter
K given by (13) with ϕ1 = 1, and for which the PDF and CDF have a simple closed-form
expression.
The distribution of Rb is well approximated by a Nakagami-m distribution in [6], and hence
γb can be approximated by a gamma distribution with shape parameter m =
n
2
ϕ2
1
a4
b
1+ϕ2−2ϕ21a4b
and
scale parameter γb = n
2γ0,bϕ
2
1a
4
b. Similarly to K, m also scales with n, which is in coherence
with the conventional approximation of the Rician distribution by a Nakagami-m distribution
[13] – only that in our case, we are approximating a generalization of the Rician distribution by
a Nakagami-m distribution. Because of the rather dissimilar behavior of the FN, the Beckmann
and the Nakagami-m distributions in terms of diversity order [14], we will consider all such
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6distributions in the derivation of the PLS performance metrics, in order to obtain insights on
when these distributions are useful to approximate the true distribution of γb.
B. Distribution of γe
When the LRS designs its phase shifts according to the legitimate link, the resulting phase
distributions for each of the eavesdropper’s R-E links Ψi are uniformly distributed by virtue
of [7]. This implies that the distribution of Re = |He| is Rayleigh distributed according to [6,
Corol. 2] with variance E{R2e} = 1/n. Hence, γe is exponentially distributed with γe = nγ0,e.
Remark 1 (Scaling law for γe). Notably, the average SNR at the eavesdropper scales with n,
whereas the average SNR at the legitimate receiver scales with n2. Hence, the scaling law for
the ratio of legitimate and wiretap SNRs is
γb
γe
∣∣∣∣
n↑
= n
γ0,b
γ0,e
[
ϕ21a
4
b +
1
n
(
1− ϕ21a4b
)]
(16)
This implies that, as long as the operational assumptions for the LRS hold, the use of a larger
LRS can provide an SNR boost to the legitimate link compared to the eavesdropper’s counterpart.
Inspection of (2) and (5) reveals that the legitimate and eavesdropper’s links share a common
part through Hi,1. However, we will now prove that both equivalent channels are statistically
independent.
Theorem 1 (Independence of legitimate and wiretap links). Let us consider the equivalent
legitimate and wiretap channels in (2) and (5). Then, Hb and He are independent if ∠Hi,e ∼
U [−pi, pi). This is the case, e.g., of considering Rayleigh fading for the LRS to eavesdropper’s
links.
Proof. See Appendix A.
IV. PLS PERFORMANCE
In this section, we will derive analytical expressions for the chief PLS performance metrics de-
fined previously. We will consider three different scenarios for our analysis, which imply different
approximations for the legitimate/wiretap links, respectively: (a) no phase errors – FN/Rayleigh
case; (b) phase errors – Beckmann/Rayleigh case; (c) phase errors – Nakagami/Rayleigh case.
For the sake of shorthand notation, we will refer to these scenarios with the subindices FR, BR
and NR, respectively.
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7A. SOP Analysis
Lemma 1 (SOP in FR scenario). The SOP and the asymptotic SOP expressions (γb → ∞) in
the absence of phase errors for LRS-aided communications are given by
PFR = 1−Q0.5 (a0, b0) + e
τ−1
τγe
+cs as√
K
Q0.5 (as, bs) , (17)
P∞FR ≃ e
−K/2+ τ−1
τγe
√
τγe(1+K)
2γb
Γ˜
(
1.5, τ−1
τγe
)
, (18)
with τ = 2RS , Γ˜(·, ·) is the regularized upper incomplete Gamma function, as =
√
K(K+1)
K+1−2γbs ,
bs =
√
2
(
K+1
2γb
− s
)
z, s = − 1
τγe
, z = τ − 1 and cs = KγbsK+1−2γbs . The Marcum Q-function
of order 0.5 can be easily computed with the help of the Gaussian Q function as Q0.5(a, b) =
Q(b− a) +Q(b+ a).
Proof. First, (17) is obtained from [15] by specializing the parameter of the κ-µ distribution to
µκ-µ = 0.5 and some manipulations. Then, (18) is obtained by using the approach in [16] with
µκ-µ = 0.5, and then substituting the resulting expression in (10) followed by some manipulations.
Lemma 2 (SOP in BR scenario). The SOP and the asymptotic SOP expressions (γb → ∞)
considering phase errors in the LRS-aided communications are given by
PBR = Fγb(τ − 1) + exp
(
τ−1
τγe
)
Muγb
(
− 1
τγe
, τ − 1
)
. (19)
P∞BR ≃ exp
(
−K(1+q
2)
2q2
)
(1+K)(1+q2)(γeτ+τ−1)
2qγb
(20)
where Fγb(·) [15, Eq. (7)] is the CDF of a squared Beckmann distribution, and Muγb (·, ·) [15,
Eq. (3)] is the upper-incomplete moment generating function (MGF) of the RV γb, which follows
a squared Beckmann distribution. The evaluation ofMuγb (·, ·) is carried out numerically through
an inverse Laplace transformation [17] over a shifted and scaled version of the (conventional)
MGF of γb, as in [15, Eq. 4], which is obtained from [13, Eq. (2.41)] with r →∞.
Proof. PBR can be obtained directly from [15, Eq. (21)] with the respective substitutions. On the
other hand, the P∞BR is derived by using [14, Proposition 3], in which d = 1, using the MGF of
γb.
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8Lemma 3 (SOP in NR scenario). The SOP and the asymptotic SOP expressions (γb → ∞)
considering phase errors in the LRS-aided communications can be approximated as
PNR = γ˜
(
m, (τ−1)m
γb
)
+ e
τ−1
τγe
Γ˜
(
m,(τ−1)
(
m
γb
+ 1
τγe
))
(
1+
γb
mτγe
)m , (21)
P∞NR ≃ e
τ−1
τγe
(
τmγe
γb
)m
Γ˜
(
m+ 1, τ−1
τγe
)
. (22)
where γ˜(·, ·) is the regularized lower incomplete Gamma functions [18, Eq. (8.350.1)].
Proof. As in the proof of Lemma 2, (21) is obtained from [15] by setting the parameters of the
κ-µ distribution κ = 0 and µ = m. Then, (22) is obtained as a particular case of [9, Eq. (21)]
with the respective substitutions.
Inspection of (18), (20) and (22) reveals a different secrecy diversity order for each of the
approximations, i.e., 1/2, 1 and m for the FR, BR and NR cases, respectively. The implications
arising from this observation will be discussed in the Numerical Results section.
B. ASC Analysis
For the sake of compactness, we will use a common formulation for the ASC metrics in the
FR, NR and BR scenarios.
Lemma 4. The ASC and the asymptotic ASC (γb → ∞) formulations over Z/Rayleigh fading
channels for LRS-aided communications can be obtained as
CS =CB − CE + GZ (γb, γe) (23)
C
∞
S ≈ CB − CE, (24)
≈ log2 (γb)− tZ − CE, (25)
where Z={Folded Normal,Beckmann,Nakagami} indicates the distribution of the legitimate link,
and tZ is a constant value that captures the fading severity loss of the legitimate link [9]. We
note that CE =
e1/γe
ln 2
E1
(
1
γe
)
denotes the average capacity of the wiretap link under the Rayleigh
approximation, with E1 (·) being the Exponential integral function, and the term GZ (γb, γe) =
e1/γe
ln 2
∫ 1
0
1
u
e−1/(uγe)Mγb
(
−1
uγe
)
du ≥ 0, where Mγb (·) is the (conventional) MGF of γb.
Proof. See Appendix B.
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9The previous Lemma allows us to evaluate the ASC in the investigated scenario in a compact
form. CB can be either computed using available results in the literature [19, 20], or evaluated
through numerical integration or quadrature methods. We note that as pointed out in [9], the
term GZ (γb, γe) vanishes as γb grows, which in our case happens as n is increased.
V. NUMERICAL EVALUATION
We now evaluate the effect of phase errors on the secrecy performance metrics in the in-
vestigated scenario, as well as the goodness of the scalar approximations for the equivalent
composite channel in LRS-assisted communications. For the links between A and the LRS,
and between the LRS and B, we consider Rician fading with parameter K = 1. The links
between the LRS and E are assumed to be Rayleigh distributed. Hence, we have that a1 =
a2,b =
√
pi/(4(K + 1))1F1 (−1/2, 1,−K), where 1F1(·) is Kummer hypergeometric’s function,
and a2,e =
√
pi/2. For the sake of brevity, we consider phase errors due to the finite number of
phase shifts available at the LRS, although similar conclusions can be extracted by considering
the phase estimation error model [6]; hence, the phase errors are uniformly distributed in the
interval [−unb , unb] with unb = −2−nbpi, where nb is the number of quantization bits used to
encode the phase shifts. Thus, from [6] we have ϕi =
sin(unb+1−i)
unb+1−i
for i = {1, 2}.
In the next figures, we set γ0,e = 10 dB, a fixed transmit power PT , and study the effect
of increasing nb; the ideal case of no phase errors is included as a reference in all instances.
The exact values for the secrecy metrics are obtained through Monte Carlo (MC) simulations.
The analytical secrecy performance metrics in the FR, NR, and BR cases are included using
the results in Section IV. These have also been double-checked offline with additional MC
simulations, which are not included in the figures for the sake of readability.
Fig. 1 shows the ASC as a function of γ0,b, for different values of nb and number of elements
at the LRS through n. Theoretical values have been evaluated with (23) and are represented
using solid lines. Asymptotic values are computed with (24) for the BR case, and with (25) for
the FR and NR cases with tFR and tNR in [20, Table II]. We extract important insights from the
observation of Fig. 1: (i) increasing n allows for improving the ASC for a fixed γ0,b, thanks to
the different scaling laws of the legitimate and wiretap average SNRs; (ii) FR (no phase errors)
and BR (phase errors) equivalent scalar approximations work pretty well regardless of n, while
the NR one underestimates the true ASC for low n; (iii) asymptotic ASC expressions are tight
for a wide range of SNR values; and (iv) the performance degradation with nb = 2 bits is small,
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Fig. 1: ASC as a function of γ0,b for different values of nb and n. Markers correspond to the
legitimate and eavesdropper channels in (2) and (5).
which confirms that state-of-the-art solutions for LRS surfaces [21] may be enough to obtain a
secrecy performance close to the case of no phase errors. Indeed, all previous remarks hold as
long as the operating assumptions of the LRS in terms of size as n grows are valid.
Fig. 2 shows the SOP as a function of γ0,b, for different values of n and nb = {2,∞}.
Theoretical values have been evaluated with the expressions included in Lemmas 1 to 3. Similar
conclusions as in the ASC can be extracted, especially confirming that nb = 2 bits allow for a
good performance compared to the ideal case. However, some relevant differences are observed:
while the equivalent scalar approximations work well in all instances for large n, there are
substantial differences between the exact simulated results and the FR, BR, and NR cases for
lower n. More importantly, the asymptotic results for the SOP may induce to confusion if
not interpreted properly: while all asymptotic results are tight (i.e., they all coincide with the
July 28, 2020 DRAFT
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correspond to the legitimate and eavesdropper channels in (2) and (5).
analytical SOP expressions for each case), the different secrecy diversity order inherent to each
of the equivalent scalar approximations is translated into a different decay of the high-SNR
slopes. Because of the high line-of-sight condition of the FR and BR scalar approximations,
the asymptotes kick-in at very low SOP values; conversely, the NR asymptote seems to better
capture the abrupt decay of the SOP for the operating range of probability values. In any case,
asymptotic analyses for the SOP should be exercised with caution when using the equivalent
scalar approximations, as they may not be representative of the actual behavior of the real
LRS-assisted channel.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
The potential of LRS for PLS and the usefulness of equivalent scalar channel approximations
for performance evaluation in such contexts have been exemplified, both theoretically and by
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simulation. Even when the LRS has a limited phase resolution of 2 bits, the different scaling
laws for the desired and eavesdropper’s SNRs allows for improving the PLS performance in
LRS-assisted communications. The implications of using multiple antenna devices by all agents,
and the potential impact of spatial correlation in the fading links are key aspects to be further
investigated.
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF THEOREM 1
Using the law of total expectation, and conditioning on the set Z = {Hi,1, Hi,b,Θi}, we can
write E{HbHe} = E{E {HbHe|Z}} = E{HbE {He|Z}}. Now, the inner expectation can be
expanded as
E {He|Z} = 1
n
n∑
i=1
|Hi,1|E
{|Hi,e|ejΨi} . (26)
Now, by virtue of [7] the distribution of Ψi is uniform in any interval of length 2pi provided
that ∠Hi,e is uniformly distributed in the same interval. Under the mild assumption that |Hi,e|
and ejΨi are independent, which is the case for instance of |Hi,e| being Rayleigh distributed,
then it yields that E {He|Z} = 0. Hence, the independence between Hb and He is stated. This
completes the proof.
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF THEOREM 1
From the definitions in (11) and (12), we use the expression of the CDF of the exponential
distribution for the wiretap link. After integration by parts, two terms are identified; the first one
corresponds to CE in (23), whereas the second one reduces to GZ (γb, γe) after: (i) leveraging
the integral definition of the Exponential integral function in [18] in (23), (ii) changing the order
of integration, and (iii) using the definition of the MGF. As for the asymptotic ASC results, they
hold by virtue of [9, eq. (43)].
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